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ABSTRACT
This papers studies how competition affects machine learning (ML) predictors. As ML becomes more
ubiquitous, it is often deployed by companies to compete over customers. For example, digital platforms
like Yelp use ML to predict user preference and make recommendations. A service that is more often
queried by users, perhaps because it more accurately anticipates user preferences, is also more likely
to obtain additional user data (e.g. in the form of a Yelp review). Thus, competing predictors cause
feedback loops whereby a predictor’s performance impacts what training data it receives and biases its
predictions over time. We introduce a flexible model of competing ML predictors that enables both rapid
experimentation and theoretical tractability. We show with empirical and mathematical analysis that
competition causes predictors to specialize for specific sub-populations at the cost of worse performance
over the general population. We further analyze the impact of predictor specialization on the overall pre-
diction quality experienced by users. We show that having too few or too many competing predictors in
a market can hurt the overall prediction quality. Our theory is complemented by experiments on several
real datasets using popular learning algorithms, such as neural networks and nearest neighbor methods.
1 Introduction
This paper studies what happens when machine learning predictors compete against each other. Machine learning (ML)
systems are deployed in ever more ubiquitous applications ranging from commerce to healthcare. And it is becoming in-
creasingly common for competing companies in similar markets to use ML to improve their services and attract customers.
For example, firms like Yelp and Tripadvisor both use ML to predict what item a user likes and make recommendations.
Competing ML predictors can emerge in diverse settings. Competing lenders use their ML predictors to assess client
credit and offer loan packages. In the ML-as-a-service industry, companies routinely compete to sell their ML algorithms to
clients. While the details of the competition vary across settings, a key characteristic is that competition generates temporal
dynamics and feedback loops for the learning algorithms. A predictor’s performance at one time instance could impact the
training data it (and its competitors) receives. Training sets are no longer independent samples from the population distribu-
tion (this is the statistical definition of sample bias). In turn, this affects the performance and bias of the predictor over time.
In this paper, we propose a model of competing ML predictors that captures the key features of these interactions and
feedback loops. We investigate several common classes of predictors, including neural networks and nearest-neighbor
models. Through experiments and theoretical analysis, we demonstrate that competition leads to specialization: while
predictors perform better for specific sub-populations, they perform worse on the whole data distribution compared
to when there is no competition. Moreover, we show that the overall performance of this ecosystem of ML predictors—i.e.
the quality of service experienced by the user—is non-monotonic. The overall quality is diminished when there are
too few or too many competing ML predictors. There is an optimal number of competing predictors that provides the
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best overall performance. This optimal number depends on several factors that we analyze, one critical factor being
how well the users can individually identify the predictor that’s best suited for them.
Contributions As ML systems become ever more widely used, often by competing companies, it is increasingly
important to model and characterize the effects and biases of competition on ML. This topic has been relatively
under-explored in ML. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
1. We introduce a novel model for competing predictors, which enables both rapid experimentation and theoretical
analysis. Our model can be generally useful for exploring statistical, algorithmic, and economic phenomena
concerning the feedback dynamics between populations of competing predictors and users.
2. Through empirical and theoretical analysis, we show that user decisions create a feedback loop through which each
ML predictor specializes toward a particular sub-population over time, often at the cost of worse performance over
the general population.
3. We analyze the effect of predictor specialization on the overall performance quality received by the users. We show
that the overall quality can be non-monotonic in the number of competing ML predictors.
2 Model for competing predictors
The initial training dataD(i)0 corresponds to the data that each predictor starts with—e.g. data from an initial pilot. We
typically think of |D(i)0 | as small. SELECT captures the probability that each predictor is selected as a function of the
true label yt and all of the predictions {yˆ(i)t }. It is important to consider what are the desirable properties for SELECT.
Intuitively, users should be more likely to query a model that makes a correct prediction. We can refer to this as user bias. In
the real-world, users have some signal about the predictors, perhaps based on past experiences or hearsay. Because users are
seeking to get the highest quality predictions, it makes sense they should be able to do better than random guessing. Thus,
even though the users do not know the true yt (otherwise there’s no need for the predictors), they do have some noisy notion
of which yˆ(i)t is more likely to be correct. Formally, for relevant loss function ` and for all u,v∈Y , we assume Pr(wt=
i|yˆ(i) =u)>Pr(wt=j|yˆ(j) =v)⇐⇒`(yt,u)<`(yt,v). In a strict sense, this mathematical formalization of user bias may
not hold in the real-world if users act irrationally or under misinformation, but this is largely outside the scope of this work.
In our experiments and analyses, we use a widely-used softmin parametric model for SELECT:
Pr(SELECT= i)=exp
(
−α`(y,yˆ(i))
)
/
∑
i∈[k]
exp(−α`(y,yˆ(i)))
This softmin model is commonly used to capture user decision making because it satisfies Luce’s choice axioms
[1, 2, 3, 4] and emerges from the established information-theoretic notion of rational inattention in economics [5, 6, 7, 8].
The softmin model can be derived from optimal decision making under information processing constraints [9, 10, 11].
We choose this model because while it satisfies the realistic user bias assumption, it is sufficiently generic to avoid the
pitfall of overly extrapolating from the specific details of a narrower model. Crucially, it is also easily parameterized. The
temperature parameter α captures how informed the selection is. When α=0, user has zero information and uniformly
randomly selects a predictor. Asα increases, the user is more likely to select the algorithm that makes the correct prediction.
We can view α as a metric of information efficiency in the multi-agent system. We re-emphasize that although SELECT
depends on the correct prediction, this is not that same thing as the users knowing the correct prediction. This dependency
merely captures the assumption that users have some degree of side-information about the correctness of the predictions.
A simplification that we make in our model is that only the selected predictor receives (xt,yt). There are several
possible modeling variation on this: for example, one could allow the non-selected predictors to add xt (not yt) to its
database and this could be used for semi-supervised learning. One could also allow the user selection to depend not
just on the current predictions but also on predictor reputation. These are interesting directions for follow up exploration.
In this paper, we make the simplification in order to capture the key essence due to competition in purely supervised
learning. More details and formal definition of the model is provided in Appendix C.
3 Experiments
We present simulations of competing learners in the supervised (3.1) and collaborative filtering settings (3.2). We
investigate the effects of competition on the predictors and the users and empirically characterize predictor specialization
and non-monotonicity of the quality-of-prediction.
3.1 Supervised Learning
We use several popular benchmark datasets for D: Postures [12, 13], Adult Income [13], and FashionMNIST
[14]. For Postures and Adult Income in particular, each datum corresponds to data from one individual, which is
particularly appropriate for our motivating competition setting. We explore the effects of different information efficiency
value α. For each dataset, we fix a small number of i.i.d seed samples (order 100 - 102) and run the simulation for a
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large number of rounds (order 103 to 104). We perform our experiments with the widely-used multi-layer perceptron
(MLP) as an example of parametric predictors and nearest-neighbors (NN) as an example of non-parametric predictors.
In Appendix B we also report similar simulations conducted with a logistic regression model as well as full details of
all the experiments. While there are many other classes of predictors to explore, we believe that the standard models
used here cleanly capture the key insights.
Competition drives predictor specialization We performed experiments with four competing predictors (similar
results are seen for other number of predictors). In Fig. 1 we present heatmaps indicating the accuracy of the four
competing predictors on each of the label classes. Red (blue) indicates that a predictor is better (worse) than the average
predictor on that class.
Figure 1: Predictor specialization heatmaps for FashionMNIST (top row) and Postures (bottom row) with nearest-neighbors
classification (NN, left column) and multi-layer perceptrons (MLP, right column). For each dataset and algorithm we include heatmaps
of α at low (0), medium (2), and high (8) values (left to right). Each heatmap is a #(classes)× #(predictors) grid. The ij-th block in a
grid indicates the difference between the average class-conditional accuracy for the i-th class and the j-th predictor’s class-conditional
accuracy for the i-th class. Predictors are indexed by an arbitrary id number and classes are labeled on the left. Red indicates an
accuracy that is higher than average, blue indicate an accuracy that is lower than average, and white is average.
Whenα=0, the user randomly selects a predictor and the lack of competition results in all of the predictors being close to
average. Asα increases, we see a clear trend towards greater variations in class-conditional accuracy among the predictors,
indicating specialization. A stark example of this can be observed for the competing MLPs on the Postures dataset. For
largeα, the four predictors specialize over the five classes such that each predictor strongly favors only one particular class
(except for predictor 3 which favors 2 classes). Predictor 0 specializes in detecting stop, predictor 2 specializes in fist,
predictor 3 specializes in fingers and predictor 1 is split between point and grab. Outside of each predictor’s specialty
class, the performance is low across the board. Largerα creates positive feedback loop that leads to specialization. Random
variation in the initial training batches generates some heterogeneity in the predictors. Users are likely to select the predictor
that is best suited for them with large α. This leads that predictor to improve its model specifically for that sub-population.
In turn, this results in an increased likelihood that members of that sub-population select said predictor. While a common
business strategy is for firms to intentionally specialize to particular sub-populations from the onset [15, 16], the interesting
aspect of the phenomena here is that specialization emerges naturally (and unintentionally) due to the competition over data.
We next quantify how specialization affects the predictor’s performance on the overall population distribution, which
is measured as its average accuracy overD. Note thatD is different from the distribution of users that actually selects the
predictor—as we shall see next, the predictor does better on the latter distribution. Fig. 2 measures the change in accuracy
overD compared to the α=0 baseline, which uses the same number of training samples but removes competition.
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Figure 2: How specialization affects predictor performance: number of predictors (x-axes, log-scale) vs. change in accuracy over
general populationD (y-axes, in percentage) for nearest-neigbors (NN) and multilayer perceptrons (MLP) on 3 datasets. To measure
the effect of competition, change in accuracy is with respect to a baseline simulation in which winning predictors get an i.i.d sample
instead of the one that selected it to remove selection bias. Confidence intervals are standard error of the mean for 5 replicates.
There is a consistent trend that increasing the information efficiency α at any number of predictors results in lower
accuracy onD. The drop in accuracy is largest when there is an intermediate number of predictors. This is because the
average number of samples each predictor receives decreases when there are more predictors, since the total number
of rounds/samples is fixed. With fewer data points, there’s less feedback to bias the predictor. The decrease in accuracy
for the overall distribution could be costly when the company tries to broaden its user-base to the entireD. This is an
important consequence of specialization.
Prediction quality for users We shift our focus to analyze the prediction quality experienced by the users. We
define the prediction quality for users as the average accuracy of the selected predictor averaged over all the rounds of
competition. Fig. 3 shows how this quality varies as the number of predictors (x-axes) and α (different colors) change for
NN and MLP applied to three datasets. In each panel, the total number of datapoints (i.e. users) is fixed. Prediction quality
for users is consistently higher when users have more information (larger α) when picking the predictor. Interestingly,
we find that the prediction quality for users can be non-monotonic. For example, in Postures data with competing NNs,
the highest quality is achieved with 16 competing predictors; having too few or too many predictors decreases quality.
The intuition for this phenomenon is as follows. When there is just one predictor, a user has no choice and changing
α has no effect. With more predictors and relatively high information efficiency, each user can select the predictor that’s
likely to be accurate for it, and hence the prediction quality improves. However, when there are too many predictors, each
predictor gets fewer training data (recall that the total number of data points is fixed). Hence none of the predictors is very
accurate and the overall quality starts to decline. In Section 4, we show this phenomena is a mathematical consequence of
the learning competition under some mild conditions. The prediction quality over a full range of information efficiencies
depicting the monotone increasing and decreasing regimes (for near-infinite and near-zeroα) can be found in Appendix B.
3.2 Extension to Collaborative Filtering
Previous experiments capture the setting where each user is a single data point that appears once. Here we experimentally
investigate a collaborative filtering extension where each user contributes multiple data points. Collaborative filtering
competitions follow the same structure as described in Sec. 2, with the primary differences being a new SELECT
operation and allowing repeated samples from each user. As before, we have a set of k competing recommenders. We also
have a set ofm distinct users, {U (1),...,U (m)} that are seeking recommendations over a set of r items (for simplicity, we
assume that these items are shared across the recommenders). At each round, a uniformly at random userUt selects one of
k recommenders: wt=SELECT(Ut). Then recommenderwt recommends an item forUt: A
(wt)
t (Ut)∈ [r]. There is a
4
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Figure 3: Prediction quality for users: number of predictors (log-scale) vs. avg. prediction quality for users with nearest-neigbors (NN)
and multilayer perceptrons (MLP) on 3 datasets. Prediction quality is averaged over all of the rounds in the simulation. Confidence
intervals are standard error of the mean for 5 replicates.
latent preference matrixM ∈ [0,1]r×m, whereMij is the probability that user j interacts with item i (pCTR). The interac-
tion between a user and item is feedback for the “winning” recommender,wt. This recommender observes (xt,y˜t) where
y˜t∼Bern(Mij) when item i is recommended to user j. As before: D(wt)t =D(wt)t−1 ∪(xt,y˜t) andD(i)t =D(i)t−1 for i 6=wt.
Users want to maximize the preference scores of the items that they get recommended to them, and predictors want
to maximize the number of queries for items they receive from users. In our experiments, each user keeps track of the
quality of past recommendations from each recommender and individually solves a multi-arm bandit [17] problem
with recommenders as arms when it is their turn to SELECT. Each recommender similarly solves an an online matrix
factorization problem [18] based on the observed user-item interactions using alternating least-squares [19]. We generate
M as the product of low-rank factors with i.i.d. Gaussian entries. We run the simulations for 2×105 rounds. Appendix
B contains the formal description of the model and full details of the experimental protocol and implementation.
Fig. 4 shows the collaborative filtering results. Fig. 4(left) is analogous to Fig. 2; the y-axes quantifies how well
each recommender performs over the population distribution of users. This performance is measured as the expected
probability that a randomly selected user decides to interact with the item suggested by this recommender. As in the
setting of competing predictors, competition and specialization leads to a decrease in the performance of recommenders
for the general user distribution. Fig. 4(right) is analogous to Fig. 3; the y-axes there is the prediction quality experienced
by the users (i.e. average Mij of the recommended items). We find a similar phenomenon as before: having too few
or too many recommenders can decrease the quality experienced by users. These collaborative filtering experiments
demonstrate that the phenomena that competition leads to algorithmic specialization and that there is a sweet spot for
the number of ML models can hold in diverse settings.
4 Theoretical analysis
We carry out theoretical analysis to further understand and support our empirical findings. Here we assume a binary
classification task for simplicity. Complete proofs for all of the claims are in Appendix C. The analysis in this section
can be interpreted as formalizing sufficient conditions for the effects of competition to emerge.
4.1 Cost of competition for predictors
Our experiments show that competition causes each predictor to specialize on a sub-population and perform worse on
the overall population distribution. We show for simple parametric and non-parametric models that competition results
5
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Figure 4: Collaborative filtering competition: Recommender pCTR over general population (left) and avg. prediction quality for
users (right) for varying number of recommenders (log-scale). Change in pCTR (left) is with respect to an otherwise identical baseline
simulation in which winning recommenders always get an i.i.d user sample instead of the user that selected it. Prediction quality
(right) is averaged out over all the round in the simulation. Confidence intervals are std. error of the mean from 5 replicates.
in a gap in the error rates attained by the trained predictors. LetR(A;D)=E[1{A(X) 6=Y }], where (X,Y )∼D, denote
the error rate of a predictorA on samples from the general population. The average error rate of the competing predictors
(onD) after t rounds of competition isRkt =
∑
i∈[k]R(A(i)t ;D)/k, whereA(i)t is predictor i after t rounds of competition
as described in Sec. 2 and k is the total number of competitors. The following asymptotic result concerns itself with
the perfect information limit α=∞) and holds quite generally for most non-parametric models. Plainly speaking, the
theorem says that for the worst-case distributions, the average error rate of competing predictors is not within a constant
factor of the error rate of a single predictor.
Theorem 4.1. Suppose users have perfect information (α=∞) and each predictor is trained using a non-parametric
method that is asymptotically a C-approximation to the Bayes error rate. Then, for any seed set size s= |D0|, there
existsD such that for any k>1, and , limt→∞R
k
t
R1t =∞.
The intuition for Thm. 4.1 is as follows. In the case that Y is deterministic givenX , the ML problem is effectively an
interpolation. In this case, the Bayes error rate is 0 and this error rate is asymptotically achieved by most non-parametric
methods [20] given that they areC-approximations to the Bayes rate. However, when α=∞ in a competition, an unlucky
seed set could result in a predictor never achieving 0 error rate, which breaks theC-approximation. Furthermore, this
probability can be bounded away from 0 for any finite seed set. Next we show that a risk gap still exists for finite α.
Theorem 4.2. Suppose k= 2 and both predictors use the nearest-neighbor algorithm. Let s= |D0| be the number of
i.i.d. seed samples that each predictor starts with and assume s≥2. If α> log(2), then there existsD such that
lim
t→∞
R2t
R1t
≥1+ 1
54
√
2s
(
8
9
√
s
)s/2(
1− 2
2+eα
)2
The risk ratio decreases quickly in s, indicating that sufficient seed data may be an effective counter-measure for the
non-parametric case. Also, the risk ratio grows larger for larger α, which also coincides with intuition.
We next investigate the parametric setting by analyzing an ordinary linear least squares regression. For this analysis,
we use a mean-square error (MSE) loss to measure expected riskRkt . We present two lower bounds. The first holds
for any positive information efficiency α> 0 and depends on the number of seed samples. The second holds for any
finite number of seed samples, but requires the users to have perfect information (α=∞).
Theorem 4.3. Suppose the data is generated from a linear model Y =XW+ with E(|X)=0. Assume each predictor
uses an ordinary least-squares linear regression. Let s≥ 1 be the number of i.i.d. seed samples each predictor starts
with and assume k≥2. We have the following:
(i) If α>0 then limt→∞supD
Rkt
R1t ≥1+
1
7056s3/2
(ii) If α=∞ then limt→∞supDR
k
t
R1t ≥
2k
k+1
Thm. 4.3 tells us that when α is large, there is a large penalty (close to 2× factor) incurred when there are many
competing predictors. When α is small, the penalty is also smaller but does not vanish if the number of seed samples
is not too large. Notice that for regression, the worst-case ratio of expected risks vanishes at a low-degree polynomial
rate in s. This decays far slower than the exponentially vanishing bound for non-parametric methods. This suggests that
seed data may be less helpful in mitigating the cost of competition with parametric methods than with non-parametric.
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4.2 Trade-off between # predictors and the overall prediction quality experienced by users
We analyze how the number of competing predictors affects the overall prediction quality experienced by users. We
want to characterize the dependence of quality on the number of predictors, k, and the information efficiency, α.
To make the analysis tractable, we make four natural modeling assumptions. We are most interested in cases where there
is at least enough data to train one or a few models well. This means that there is sufficient data so that in the single agent
case, the model’s accuracy is not too far from 1 (assumption 1). Concretely, we assumeR1t > 23 . Also, we should have
enough data to experience diminishing marginal returns from additional samples. This means that the individual accuracy
for one predictor is not much better than the individual accuracies for two predictors each with approximately half as
many samples (assumption 2). Concretely, we instantiate this as 0<R1t−R2t < 15 . Thus,R1t−R2t should not be too large.
Recall that we are primarily interested in regimes when seed sets are small, which implies that the initial predictors are
weak models (assumption 3). Concretely, we assume 12 <Rk0< 23 . Furthermore, we assume that a single predictor by itself,
R1t , is not too perfect relative to the accuracy gap between one and two predictors, given byR1t−R2t . Otherwise, if the solo
accuracyR1t is too close to 1, there is little room for improvement from having multiple competing predictors (assumption
4). Concretely, we will assumeR1t <1−ω(|R1t−R2t |2), where little-omega ω(·) denotes a strict lower bound. Finally,
while we allow the predictors to be correlated, they cannot be extremely correlated or anti-correlated1 (assumption 5).
Our result shows that in the regimes described above, there necessarily exists an interval of intermediate information
efficiencies, 0<c1<c2<∞ such that for α∈ (c1,c2), the optimal number of predictors is neither 1 or∞. This means
that that there is a finite “sweet spot” in the number of competing predictors that produce the best user quality.
Theorem 4.4. Assume a learning competition at round t under the conditions stated above. Define δ=R1t−R2t . Let
ρ be the pairwise covariance between two predictors. If we have ρ<R2t−(R2t )2−2δ then there exists 0<c1<c2<∞
such that if c1 <α< c2 then the expected prediction quality for users at round t is maximized by some k∗ number of
predictors such that 1<k∗<∞. In particular, c1 =log R
2−(R2)2
R2−(R2)2+2δ and c2 =log
R2+δ
2(1−R2−δ) .
To make the result concrete, we instantiateR1t←0.85, δ←0.05, ←0.1 and ρ←0. Thm 4.4 tells us that prediction
quality for users is non-monotonic if 0.65<α<2.2. This agrees reasonably well with our empirical measurements. The
intuition for the theorem is as follows. When α is not too large, having many weak predictors is not necessarily better for
users than having a few smart ones (consider the extreme case ofα→0). However, ifα is exactly zero, then having having
a single predictor is better than having even two predictors since the user is not more likely to SELECT the the correct pre-
dictor and the two predictors have split the data. But, there is a sweet spot inα for which the user benefit from being slightly
more likely to select the correct predictor outweighs the benefit that a single predictor has in terms of volume of training
data. This is due to the near-universal phenomena in ML of diminishing marginal returns in number of training samples.
5 Discussion
Related works In Mixture-of-experts (MOE) and related ensemble learning methods, multiple predictors work
together to train for a prediction task [21, 22, 23, 24]. There, the algorithms work together in the ensemble to optimize
a common objective, and data can be shared between the algorithms. This differs from our setting where the predictors
directly compete over user queries and training data.
Recent literature in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has largely focused on emergent behaviour in col-
laborative dynamics between multiple agents [25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31]. In the fully-competitive setting, MARLs are
typically modeled as zero-sum Markov games, and span a variety of applications such as exploration [30, 32], control [33],
and others [34, 35]. Existing RL approaches in multi-agent competition have studied competitions between two agents
[36, 37, 38] with a focus on the expected equilibrium outcome and agent strategies. In particular, [39] proposes that the
Nash equilibrium for two firms in similarly motivated data acquisition learning game tends toward monopoly at the expense
of consumer welfare. We differ from this line of work by explicitly modeling both the predictors and user decisions, incor-
porating user and sampling biases into our model, and by allowing for any number of predictors and users. This flexibility
is critical as we find that the quality of prediction experienced by users heavily depends on the number of competing predic-
tors. Another substantial difference between our analysis and that proposed in [39] is that ours takes into the account the
particular structure of a given supervised learning algorithm. On the other hand, the analysis in [39] generically assumes
learning algorithms can be replaced by black-boxes that simply behave according to canonical minimax error rates.
Another body of work focuses on examining and addressing single-agent direct feedback loops present in sample
selection, namely sample bias [40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46], but the problem remains under-explored in the case of
multi-agent competition. Other forms of feedback loop in ML systems that have been explored include: social media
filter bubbles [47], risk assessment [48] , and algorithmic policing [49]. Dueling algorithms have been explored in [50],
though they did not consider any statistical learning settings.
1To see why this is necessary, consider the case in which the predictors are perfectly correlated. They always give the same
prediction and thus the users derive no benefit from the competition.
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Extensions, limitations and future works This paper proposes a model of competing predictors that enables both
empirical and theoretical investigations. We characterize several interesting phenomena, namely how competition leads
predictors to specialize and how too little or too much competition can both hurt the quality of prediction experienced
by users. Because this is a relatively new direction of research in ML, we make several simplifications that allow the
model to capture the essence of competition without overly complicating the insights. Most of our experiments and
theory focus on the setting where each user corresponds to a single data point and only appears once. This is reasonable
in applications with large populations of users and relatively infrequent repeated interaction. We conduct collaborative
filtering experiments in which users and recommenders repeatedly interact over time, and find the phenomena remain.
Additional investigation of repeated interactions is a fertile direction for future study.
A simplification we have made is that predictors do not directly interact with other predictors except through their
competition over data. In practice, companies behind the ML predictors may merge, intentionally differentiate (which
could lead to further specialization) or spend money to acquire data. A more general model that captures the full game
dynamics would define strategy spaces and payoffs for each predictor and user, and characterize incentive compatible
strategies.Finally, we have assumed that the predictor that is selected receives the true label. In practice, there could
be additional noise and time lag in the outcome that the predictor observes. This could also be interesting to model.
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A Extended Discussion
Due to space constraints, we continue a supplementary discussion here. Experimental Details can be found in Appendix
B and Mathematical Details can be found in Appendix C.
A.1 Economic & Multi-Agent Theory
Many of the concepts and quantities we study in this work have parallels in economic theory [51, 52, 53, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58,
59, 60, 59, 60]. For example, quality of prediction is a notion of consumer welfare. The economics literature tends to focus
on competition between firms or mathematical agents, rather than on specific ML predictors. It would be an interesting
direction for future work to connect and extend our learning competition framework from the economic perspective.
A.2 Feedback Loops in ML Systems
Feedback loops, where two systems repeatedly influence and have access to only the decisions of the other, have been
studied in supervised and reinforcement learning [47]. A related and interesting example includes the feedback in online
reviews on digital media platforms [61, 62, 63]. Existing works examine feedback loops in the single-agent setting [64],
with particular branches proposing metrics to recover counterfactuals of consumer preferences fixing consumer strategy
[65, 66]. The effects of competition in ML holds significant implications to sociology [67, 68], economics [69, 70, 71],
electoral systems [72, 73], and recommendation systems [74, 75, 76, 77]. [78] studies an interesting but substantially
different model of bandits in matching markets. The model we study here is also distinct from standard settings for online
learning or active learning, where typically a single algorithm gets to explore and select data. In our setup, each data
selects one among several competing algorithms.
B Experimental Details
B.1 Supervised learning
We ran three datasets for our supervised learning simulations: Postures [12, 13], Adult Income [13], and
FashionMNIST [14]. Postures has 5 classes. Adult Income has 2 classes. FashionMNIST has 10 classes. In the main
text we reported results for NN and MLP. Our implementation is in Python [79] using Pytorch [80] and Numpy [81]
frameworks.
Algorithm 1 Competing predictors
Input: Set of predictorsA, set of consumers, U , ground-truth distribution PUY , loss function l, predictor observation channel Θ
# To initialize, all predictors warm-start with s i.i.d seed samples
for a∈A do
(U,Y )s∼PUY (i.i.d)
a.train((U,Y )s)
end for
# The competition begins
for 0≤ t<T do
Ut∼PU # User sampled from general population
at←Ut.query() # User decides which predictor to query based on private information
at.reward←at.reward+1 # predictors seek to maximize number of queries
Yˆt←at.predict(Ut) # predictor responds to user query
Ut.reward←1−l(Yˆt,Ut) # User payoff determined by quality of the response
at.train((Ut,Θ(Y ))) # predictor updates model based on noisy feedback from user
end for
B.1.1 Hyperparameters and Training Protocols
Seed samples For each data set we set a number of seed samples that was sufficient to train a model to perform slightly
(a few percentage points) better than random guessing. For Postures and Adult we set a seed size of 3 samples. For
FashionMNIST we set a seed size of 100.
NN For NN, we always use one nearest-neighbor to keep things simple. Because the method is non-parametric, training
the model just consists of appending each new sample to the data matrix. Refer to [82, 83] for more details on the
nearest-neighbor algorithm.
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MLP For the MLP, we use the same architecture hyper-parameters for each α in order to ensure consistency. All predic-
tors used the same hyper-parameters and training protocol as well. We selected these by doing a small amount of manual
tuning. We use Pytorch’s Adam optimizer [84] to train our MLPs (with default settings). For all datasets, we use 1 hidden
layer. At the start of the competition, we used Pytorch’s default initialization. After this, we never reinitialized the weights.
Instead, we always fine-tune the weights from the previous training pass. Refer to [85] for more details about MLPs.
For Postures the input width is 16 and the hidden width is 16. We used a learning rate of 10−3. After the initial training
on the seed samples, we retrained after every 4th new data point was added to the set. When training, we used we batch size
of (up to) 32. We randomly shuffled the data for each training instance. We trained until we had updated on 1,000 data points
or reached 32 epochs (whichever was met first – this depended on the number of data samples the predictor had observed).
For Adult Income the input width is 50 and the hidden width is 64. We used a learning rate of 10−3. After the initial
training on the seed samples, we retrained after every 32nd new data point was added to the set. When training, we used
we batch size of (up to) 32. We randomly shuffled the data for each training instance. We trained until we had updated
on 1,000 data points or reached 32 epochs.
For FashionMNIST the input width is 784 and the hidden width is 400. We used a learning rate of 10−4. After the
initial training on the seed samples, we retrained after every 500th new data point was added to the set. When training,
we used we batch size of (up to) 50. We randomly shuffled the data for each training instance. We trained until we had
reached 30 epochs.
Number of Iterations The simulation takes time (roughly) quadratic in the number of iterations because of the
frequent retraining that takes place. For Postures and Adult, we run the competition for 2,000 rounds when using
the NN and we run the competition for 4,000 rounds when using the MLP. For FashionMNIST we run the competition
for 10,000 rounds for both algorithms.
B.2 Collaborative Filtering
We describe the protocol for the collaborative filtering experiments in detail. Recall that at each round t, one ofm users
is sampled uniformly at random. The sampled user at time t, denotedUt, must then query one of k recommenders. The
selected recommender then recommends one of r items. We have an underlying preference matrix,M ∈ [0,1]r×m such
thatMij is the j-th user’s preference score for item . The goal of the users is to maximize the the preference score
Preference Matrix For our simulation we set r← 12 and m← 64. We sweep over k as seen in Fig. 4. We sample
Wij ∼N(0,1) for W ∈Rm×3 and we sample Vij ∼N(0,1) for V ∈Rr×3. We compute M ′=VWT and then affine
scaleM ′ onto [0,1] to produce the final preference matrixM . The final rank ofM is 4 (the rank increases by 1 due to
the affine scaling).
Users Each user operates independently of the others without sharing data or otherwise communicating. Users treat
each recommender as an arm in a k-arm bandit problem. Users operate as if the arms are stationary in time (although this
is actually false since the recommenders can improve in time). The reward each user obtains from each recommendation
is dictated the underlying preference matrix. Each user uses an -greedy strategy to SELECT a recommender. When
user i is selecting ←τ−0.3i where τi is the total number of rounds in which user i has participated thus far.
Recommenders Recommenders use online matrix factorization to reconstruct the underlying preference matrix. Each
recommender uses an -greedy strategy to recommend items to users based on their current representation. Recommenders
do not directly observeMij when they recommend item i to user j. Instead, they observe noisy feedback sampled from
a Bernoulli trial with mean Mij . Recommender a has their own copy of Wˆ (a) ∈Rm×4 and Vˆ (a) ∈Rr×4 which are
initialized with independent uniform random entries. See algorithm below for the psuedo-code for this implementation.
The dependence on a is implicit (again, each recommender solves their own instance of the problem with their own data).
Algorithm 2 Online Matrix Factorization Update for Collaborative Filtering
Input: User index i, item index j, Y˜ ∼ Bern(Mij), number of observations for pair (i,j), denoted νij , learning rate γ and
regularization penalty λ
Mˆij← νij−1νij Mˆij+
1
νij
Y˜ # Update running average pair (i,j)
Vˆi← Vˆi−γ(Mˆij−ViWTj )Wˆj−λVˆi # Update row from user matrix
Wˆj←Wˆj−γ(Mˆij−ViWTj )Vˆ (a)i −λWˆ (a)j # Update row from item matrix
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For our simulation we use λ=10−4 and γ=0.1. When recommender a chooses an item to select for user i they select
maxj{Vˆ (a)i Wˆ (a)Tj } with probability 1− and a uniformly random item with probability . For consistency with the
users, we set ←τ−0.3a where τa is the number of recommendations given out by the recommender a thus far.
B.3 Additional Experiments
We include some additional experiments and figures. In particular, we sweep wider ranges of α and we also include
some additional simulations using logistic regression as the prediction algorithm.
In Fig. 5 we report the experiment in Fig. 3 but for a wider range of α. When α is large the prediction quality for
users is monotone increasing and when α it is monotone decreasing.
In Fig. 6 we report the experiment in Fig. 2 using the logistic regression model. The trends are similar to what we
saw with the MLP and NN models.
(a) Adult – NN (b) Adult – Log. Reg. (c) Adult – MLP
(d) Postures – NN (e) Postures – Log. Reg. (f) Postures – MLP
Figure 5: Figure 3 experiment with a larger sweep of α reported
C Mathematical Details
We include mathematical and theoretical details here. This includes formal definitions for the learning competition as
well as proofs of the theorems in Sec. 4. We also include a discussion of predictor incentives.
C.1 Definitions
We proceed by formally defining the details of the competition dynamics for which the Theorems in the main text use.
This particular instance can be generalized to include a wider range of scenarios, including the collaborative filtering
simulations.
Definition C.1. (Supervised Prediction Competition)
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(a) Adult – Log. Reg.
(b) Postures – Log. Reg.
Figure 6: Figure 2 experiment with Log. Reg.
Prediction competition G=(D,A,SELECT,T ) where
1. D is a distribution over Rd×{0,1} defining a supervised classification task
2. A = {A(1),..,A(k)} is set of k competing predictors such that each predictor A(i) specifies a training algorithm
mapping a data set to a (possibly randomized) hypothesis function h :Rd→{0,1}
3. A selection rule SELECT(x,y) that specifies a conditional distribution over A given (x,y)∈ (Rd×{0,1}) and
A itself.
4. T ∈N is the number of rounds in the competition.
When it is unambiguous we may identify a predictor A(i) with their index, i. As mentioned in Sec. 2, we will use
the softmin rule, parameterized by 0≤α≤∞ as our selection rule at each round. We use 0-1 loss for `.
C.2 Proofs
Note that all logarithms log denote the natural logarithm in base e.
C.2.1 Proof of Theorem 4.1
We proceed to restate and prove Thm 4.1. Note that many non-parametric methods areC-approximations to the Bayes
error rate . For example, the nearest neighbors method is a 2-approximation [86]. Here, we use the standard notion of
aC-approximation ratio in optimization (see [87]).
Theorem C.2. (Theorem 4.1)
Suppose users have perfect information (α=∞) and each predictor is trained using a non-parametric method that
is asymptotically aC-approximation to the Bayes error rate. Let s= |D0| be the number of i.i.d. seed samples that each
predictor starts with and assume s≥5. Then there existsD such that for any k>1, limt→∞R
k
t
R1t =∞.
Proof. It will suffice to construct a distribution that can be easily analyzed. Let P denote this distribution. At a high-level,
the strategy will be to construct a noise-free ground truth P that results in any particular predictor’s expected error rate
to be bounded away from 0. This suffices to complete the claim, since any non-zero expected risk is sufficient.
We proceed to define the distribution P . Let PX be a distribution over R.
PX(x)=

1
s x=1
1− 1s x=0
0 else
and the marginal PY |X is defined by Y =X .
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Fix an arbitrary predictor. Let E be the event that this fixed predictor’s seed set will lack any points labeled 1. Then:
Pr(E)=
(
1− 1
s
)s
≥ 1
4
(1)
Where the inequality holds for any positive s. On the other hand, letF be the event that at least one other of the k−1
remaining predictors do sample a seed set that does contain a point labeled 1. Then:
Pr(F)=1−
(
1− 1
s
)s(k−1)
≥1−e−k+1 (2)
Since the events are independent, combining them yields:
Pr(F∩E)≥ 1
4
(1−e−k+1) (3)
Finally, to complete the argument, we point out that in the eventF∩E , the fixed predictor will never obtain a sample
labeled 1 because they cannot predict a 1 due to the fact that they lack any such points in their seed sets. Meanwhile,
there exists another predictor who does have a seed point labeled 1 and will correctly predict all points labeled 1. Thus,
the fixed predictor will never obtain a zero error rate. In particular we have that
Rkt ≥Pr(F∩E∩{Y =1})=
1
4s
(1−e−k+1)>0 (4)
for all t.
Of course, it is unavoidable that the error rate not decay to 0 for large s, but the linear rate of decay in the seed size
is also not particularly fast.
It is clear that because PY |X is deterministic, aC-approximation should also converge to zero in large t, but we have
shown thatRkt is bounded away from 0 for all twhen k>1. This completes the proof.
C.2.2 Proof of Theorem 4.2
It is worth clarifying that for the Thm 4.2, proved below, we will be assuming that the nearest-neighbor algorithm uses
a majority vote tie-breaking procedure when the nearest-neighbor is non-unique.
Theorem C.3. (Theorem 4.2)
Suppose k=2 and both predictors use the nearest-neighbor algorithm. Assume that Pr(Y =f(X))>1− for some
function f and < 13 , and α> log
1−
 . Let s= |D0| be the number of i.i.d. seed samples that each predictor starts with
and assume s≥2. Then there existsD such that
lim
t→∞
R2t
R1t
≥1+ (4(1−))
s/2
9
√
2s
(
1
2
−
)(
1−2 1−
1−+eα
)2
A slightly looser version that removes  dependence holds whenever α> log(2):
lim
t→∞
R2t
R1t
≥1+ 1
54
√
2s
(
8
9
√
s
)s/2(
1− 2
2+eα
)2
Proof. SupposeX= 0. Let f be constant with f(·) = 1. Let Y = 1 with probability 1− and Y = 0 with probability 
for some < 12 . This joint distribution PXY satisfies the assumptions. The fact that Y |X is non-deterministic is essential.
Without this, as long as α is finite, an interpolating non-parametric method would asymptotically ε-cover the input
domain, which would result in no penalty.
We will use the following proof strategy with P as our example distribution. For some event E :
R2t ≥Pr(E)R2t |E+(1−Pr(E))R∗ (5)
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which implies
R2t
R∗ ≥1+
Pr(E)(R2t |E−R∗)
R∗ (6)
whereR2t |E denotes the expected error rate conditioned on event E andR∗ is the Bayes error rate. We will also show
that under P :
lim
t→∞R
1
t→R∗= (7)
Combining (6) and (7) will then yield the claim. To show (7), we can simply note that the fraction of 1s in the
predictor’s data set will concentrate around 1− due to the law of large numbers [88]. Since this will be the majority,
the majority tie-breaker will be in effect, meaning that the predictor will always predict 1. This prediction is the Bayes
optimal prediction. This implies (7) holds.
To finish the proof, we must give expressions or bounds for Pr(E) andR2t |E under a suitably defined event E .
LetQ0(t) andQ1(t) be the fraction of 1s in the data sets for each predictor, respectively, at round t. Thus,Qi(0) is
the fraction of 1s in the seed set of agent i.
sQi(0)∼Bin(s,1−) (8)
We can use the following bounds on the deviations of a Binomial [89, 90, 91] to yield the following bounds:
exp
(
−sD(1
2
||1−)
)
≥Pr(Qi(0)< 1
2
)≥ 1√
2s
exp
(
−sD(1
2
||1−)
)
(9)
Where i∈{0,1} andD(a||b) is the binary relative entropy, given by
D(a||b)=alog(a
b
)+(1−a)log(1−a
1−b ) (10)
Using elementary logarithmic identities we can simplify:
exp
(
−sD(1
2
||1−)
)
=(4(1−))s/2 (11)
The tail bound inequalities simplify into:
√
2sB≥Pr(Qi(0)< 1
2
)≥B (12)
Where, as a shorthand, we letB= (4(1−))
s
2√
2s
.
We proceed to define a suitable E . In order to do so, we define eventF(τ), parameterized by 0≤τ≤∞, as follows:
F(τ)=
 ⋂
0≤l<τ
{Q0(l)< 1
2
<Q1(l)}
∪
 ⋂
0≤l<τ
{Q1(l)< 1
2
<Q0(l)}
 (13)
Let ι= argmini{Qi(0)} and ι¯= argmaxi{Qi(0)}. Let E =F(∞). Recall that Yˆ (j)t is agent j’s prediction at time
t. Observe that F(t) implies both Yˆ (ι)t = 0 and Yˆ (ι¯)t = 1 due to the majority rule. With E now defined, we proceed to
concoct a bound for Pr(E).
In eventF(0), it must be the case that predictor ι has at least one fewer 1s than 0s in the seed set and predictor ι¯ has
at least one more 1 than 0. En route for our bound on Pr(E) we derive the lower bound for Pr(F(0)) as follows. Notice
thatF(0) can be easily expressed in terms of {Qi(0)≤ 12 )}which makesB an ideal expression for bounding Pr(F(0)).
Pr(F(0))≥B(1−
√
2sB) (14)
18
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In turn, this yields us the following:
Pr(E)≥Pr(E|F(0))Pr(F(0))≥Pr(E|F(0))(2B(1−
√
2B)) (15)
Thus, we are left with the task of bounding Pr(E|F(0)) to find an expression to bound Pr(E). We proceed by using
random walk theory ([92, 93] are suitable references for the uninitiated). We will study an integer-valued stochastic
process over the integers. At time t∈N, Xt∈Z. Furthermore, Xt+1∈{Xt−1,Xt,Xt+1,}. The distribution over the
increments is defined by (q,p,r) as follows:
Pr(Xt+1 =Xt−1)=q and Pr(Xt+1 =Xt+1)=p and Pr(Xt+1 =Xt)=r (16)
We denote the random walk distribution by RW(q,p,r) and write {X}∞t=0 ∼RW(q,p,r) to associate the random
variable to the distribution. We will also define and use an independent copy of the random walk, denoted by
{X′}∞t=0∼RW(q′,p′,r′). The analysis of random walks is a rich subject and many techniques are known for computing
various probabilities for events of interest. Of particular utility here is the fact that if X0 = 1 and qq+p <
1
2 , then the
probability that the walk never reaches the origin is given by
Pr(Xt>0,∀t)=1− 2q
q+p
(17)
This result that can be obtained by solving a recurrence relation, as in [92, 93]. Notice that the probability that a
random walk with bias (q,p,r) ever reaches the origin is the same as a random walk with bias ( qq+p ,
p
q+p ,0). We will
assume that the random walks start at 1: X0 =X′0 =1.
For convenience, we will define eventsH(τ) as follows.
H(τ)=
⋂
0≤l≤τ
({Xl>0}∩{X′l>0}) (18)
As we will see, our target Pr(E|F(0)) can be bounded by the probability that the random walks in question never
reach the origin: Pr(H(∞))=Pr(Xt>0,X′t>0,∀t). To see how this works, we begin by considering the following
choices for (q,p,r) and (q,p,r):
(q,p,r)=
(

1+eα
,
(1−)eα
1+eα
,
1−+eα
1+eα
)
(19)
(q′,p′,r′)=
(
1−
1+eα
,
eα
1+eα
,
(1−)eα+
1+eα
)
(20)
Also note that it is easy to give Pr(H(∞)) in terms of (q,p,r) and (q,p,r) by noting that Pr(H(∞)) = Pr(Xt >
0,∀t)Pr(X′t>0,∀t).
Pr(H(∞))=
(
1− 2q
q+p
)(
1− 2q
′
q′+p′
)
(21)
The reason for this choice will be made apparent later. By assumption we know that α is not too small and  is not
too large. Precisely, the conditions are: α> log 1− and <
1
2 . With elementary algebra one can verify these conditions
are sufficient to imply that qq+p<
1
2 and
q′
q′+p′ <
1
2 .
We proceed to construct a relationship between Xt and Qι¯(t) and between X′t and Qι(t). We introduce S(t) =
SELECT(t) as a shorthand notation. Let 1(·) denote the indicator function. ConsiderWt andW ′t defined as below:
Wt=
(
s+
t∑
l=1
1(S(l)= ι¯)
)
(2Qι¯(t)−1) (22)
W ′t =
(
s+
t∑
l=1
1(S(l)= ι)
)
(1−2Qι(t)) (23)
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Intuitively,W is renormalizingQι¯ from # of 1stotal # to (# of 1s)−(# of 0s) (and analogously forW ′t andQι). Under this
transform, we can expressF(τ) in terms ofW andW ′ as follows:
F(τ)=
⋂
0≤l<τ
({Wl>0}∩{W ′l >0}) (24)
Because, of course,Wt>0 if and only ifQι¯> 12 (and analogously forW
′
t andQι). Recalling that SELECT uses the
softmin rule and with Bayes rule [92, 94] we can obtain the following expressions for the distribution over the increments
toW andW ′. Notice that when conditioning onF(t−1), we know that Yˆ (ι)t =0 because learner ι’s dataset must have
a majority of 0s. Similarly, Yˆ (ι¯)t =1.
Pr(Wt=Wt−1−1|F(t−1))=Pr(S(t)= ι¯,Yt=0|F(t−1))= 
1+eα
=q (25)
Pr(Wt=Wt−1+1|F(t−1))=Pr(S(t)= ι¯,Yt=1|F(t−1))= (1−)e
α
1+eα
=p (26)
Pr(Wt=Wt−1|F(t−1))=Pr(S(t)= ι|F(t−1))= 1−+e
α
1+eα
=r (27)
Pr(W ′t =W
′
t−1−1|F(t−1))=Pr(S(t)= ι,Yt=1|F(t−1))=
1−
1+eα
=q′ (28)
Pr(W ′t =W
′
t−1+1|F(t−1))=Pr(S(t)= ι,Yt=0|F(t−1))=
eα
1+eα
=p′ (29)
Pr(W ′t =W
′
t−1|F(t−1))=Pr(S(t)= ι¯|F(t−1))=
(1−)eα+
1+eα
=r′ (30)
This reveals the reasoning behind the choices for (q,p,r) and (q,p,r). We proceed to bound the increments of W
andW ′ by usingX andX′, but this requires a bit more work. Observe that (W,W ′)t are coupled whereas (X,X′)t are
independent. The trick will be the couple (W,W ′)t and (X,X′)t in a prudent way. To this end, we will introduce a third
random process, (Z,Z ′)t. First, define ρ¯(t) and ρ(t) as follows:
ρ¯(t)= min
m∈St(Xj)
m (31)
ρ(t)= min
m∈St(X′j)
m (32)
where St is a set-valued function defined over sequences {xj}∞j=0 as:
St({xj})={i : i∈N,
i∑
j=0
1(xj 6=0)≥ t} (33)
where N is the set of natural numbers (including zero). Intuitively, ρ¯(t) is computing the index of process X that
corresponds to t-th non-zero increment (and analogously for ρ(t) andX′). As forZt andZ ′t:
Zt=Xρ¯(t) (34)
Z ′t=X
′
ρ(t) (35)
IntuitivelyZt corresponds to the sequence one would obtain fromXt with the zero increments deleted (and analogously
forZ ′t andX
′
t). Let
Z(τ)=
⋂
0≤l<τ
({Zl>0}∩{Z ′l>0}) (36)
AnyXt sequence that reaches the origin in finite time will do so with the non-zero increments deleted, which implies
that Zt will also reach the origin (and analogously for Z ′t and X
′
t). This implies the key fact that event Z(∞) occurs
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ifH(∞) occurs. Also,H(∞) occurs almost surely ifZ(∞) occurs. EventsZ(∞) andH(∞) are equivalent up to a set
of measure zero. Namely, the measure zero event that eitherXt orX′t produces a finite number of non-zero increments.
Pr(Z(∞))=Pr(H(∞)) (37)
It remains to coupleWt withZt andW ′t withZ
′
t. We do so as follows by defining ψ¯(t) and ψ(t)
ψ¯(t)∼Bin(t,r) (38)
ψ(t)= t−ψ¯(t) (39)
Wt=Zψ¯(t)+W0−1 (40)
W ′t =Z
′
ψ(t)+W
′
0−1 (41)
Notice that because r+r′= 1, the marginals are preserved which makes this a valid coupling. Also notice that the
eventZ(∞) impliesF(∞)|F(0) outside of the measure zero event that either ψ¯(t) or ψ(t) remain bounded as t→∞:
Pr(F(∞)|F(0))≥Pr(Z(∞)) (42)
Pr(E|F(0))=Pr(F(∞)|F(0))≥Pr(Z(∞))=Pr(H(∞)) (43)
We proceed to establish the bound on Pr(E|F(0)). Consider the following:
Pr(E|F(0))=Pr(F(∞)|F(0))≥Pr(H(∞))=
(
1− 2q
q+p
)(
1− 2q
′
q′+p′
)
(44)
Thus, we can combine our bounds for Pr(F(0)) and Pr(E|F(0)) to obtain a bound on Pr(E):
Pr(E)≥B(1−
√
2sB)
(
1− 2q
q+p
)(
1− 2q
′
q′+p′
)
(45)
It now remains to get a bound forR2t |E . Of course, this is easy now that we have ascertained that in event E , we know
that ι (ι¯) always has a majority 0s (1s) thus always predicts 0 (1). From this it follows immediately by taking an average that
R2t |E=
1
2
∀t =⇒ lim
t→∞R
2
t |E=
1
2
(46)
Combining the bounds gives:
lim
t→∞
R2t
R1t
≥1+ Pr(E)(R
2
t |E−R∗)
R∗ ≥1+B(1−
√
2sB)
(
1
2
−
)(
1− 2q
q+p
)(
1− 2q
′
q′+p′
)
(47)
At the expense of a looser bound, we can simplify the bound by a series of additional approximations in order to obtain
an interpretable expression:
(
1− 2q
q+p
)(
1− 2q
′
q′+p′
)
≥
(
1− 2q
q+p
)2
=
(
1−2 1−
1−+eα
)2
(48)
Which follows because q
′
q′+p′ >
q
q+p .
We can also crudely simplify theB-term under the assumption that ≤ 13 :
B≤ 1√
2s
(49)
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In turn, this implies,
B(1−
√
2sB)≥B
9
(50)
Thus, we arrive at a neater expression in terms of , s, and α:
lim
t→∞
R2t
R1t
≥1+ (4(1−))
s/2
9
√
2s
(
1
2
−
)(
1−2 1−
1−+eα
)2
(51)
Finally, we can remove the dependence on  by fixing = 13 :
lim
t→∞
R2t
R1t
≥1+ 1
54
√
2s
(
8
9
√
s
)s/2(
1− 2
2+eα
)2
(52)
C.2.3 Proof of Theorem 4.3
It will be helpful to separately prove a lemma for use in Theorem 4.3’s proof. This lemma upper bounds the variance
of a symmetrical truncated Binomial with the variance of a usual Binomial with the same number of trials as support
left in the truncated Binomial. To clarify notion in the proof of the lemma, note that we define f(x)∝g(x) to mean:
f(x)=Cg(x) ∀x∈X (53)
where C is some fixed constant independent of x and the equation holds over all choices of x in some set X which
can be inferred from context.
Lemma C.4. IfX∼Bin(2n, 12 ), then for any integer c such that n>c>0:
Var(X|n−c≤X≤n+c)≥Var(Bin(2c,1/2))= c
2
Proof. As a notional shorthand, we will useXtr to denote the truncated version ofX:
Xtr∼X|{n−c≤X≤n+c} (54)
By the definition of truncation, Pr(Xtr =x)∝Pr(X =x) for all x in the truncated support. From this, it follows
thatXtr inherits symmetry and unimodality fromX . Furthermore, from the Binomial pmf it also directly follows that
Pr(X=x)∝(nx) because p= 12 . LetXsup denote the usual Binomial defined over the truncated support:
Xsup∼Bin(2c,1/2)+n−c (55)
The constant translation is just an aesthetic to keep the supports of Xsup and Xtr identical. Observe that for both
Xsup and Xtr, n is both the mean and the mode outcome (keep in mind the symmetry and unimodality of both). We
will complete the proof by showing that:
1≥Pr(Xtr =n+j)
Pr(Xtr =n)
≥Pr(Xsup =n+j)
Pr(Xsup =n)
for all j in the support (56)
Notice that this inequality would imply thatXtr is strictly less concentrated thatXsup, and since they have the same
support, are unimodal, and are symmetric, it follows thatXtr has higher variance. We proceed to demonstrate this key
inequality.
Based on our established proportionality rules we can express the inequality in terms of factorials:
Pr(Xtr =n+j)
Pr(Xtr =n)
=
(
2n
n+j
)(
2n
n
) = (n!)2
(n+j)!(n−j)! =
j∏
i=1
n−i
n+i
(57)
22
COMPETING AI - SEPTEMBER 16, 2020
Pr(Xsup =n+j)
Pr(Xsup =n)
=
(
2c
c+j
)(
2c
c
) (c!)2
(c+j)!(c−j)! =
j∏
i=1
c−i
c+i
(58)
In order to compare these quantities, consider the following:
j∏
i=1
c+1−i
c+1+i
>
j∏
i=1
c−i
c+i
(59)
In order to see the correctness of the above inequality, consider any particular term in the product:
c+1−i
c+1+i
>
c−i
c+i
(60)
(c+1−i)(c+i)>(c+1+i)(c−i) (61)
2i>0 (62)
From which we can conclude that the inequality over the entire product:
∏j
i=1
c+1−i
c+1+i >
∏j
i=1
c−i
c+i must hold since
it holds over each term and all are positive. By inductively applying the product inequality, we can then conclude the
key inequality because n>c:
j∏
i=1
n−i
n+i
≥
j∏
i=1
c−i
c+i
(63)
Theorem C.5. (Theorem 4.3)
Suppose the data is generated from a linear model Y =XW+with E(|X)=0. Assume each predictor is uses an
ordinary least-squares linear regression. Let s≥1 be the number of i.i.d. seed samples each predictor starts with. We
have the following:
(i) If α>0 and k≥2 then limt→∞supDR
k
t
R1t ≥1+
1
3567s3/2
(ii) If α=∞ then limt→∞supDR
k
t
R1t ≥
2k
k+1
Proof. For both parts it will be helpful to recall the seminal result of White which shows the consistency of the OLS
estimate for linear models [95]. Thus,R1t converges to the minimum mean square error.
Proof of (ii) We first prove part (ii). It is sufficient to construct a PXY satisfying the linear model assumptions that
can be easily analyzed. In this proof, we construct PXY such that with perfect information and OLS updates, the learning
dynamics reduce into the sequential K-means dynamics studied in [96]. To be more precise, the resultant random process
over the tuple of each predictor’s OLS weight estimates is almost the same as that over the tuple of centroids in sequential
K-means, in a sense that will be made formal in this proof. First we restate the notion of a sequentialK-means process,
originally defined in [96].
Definition C.6. (SequentialK-means process)
Let P be a non-atomic distribution over R with bounded first and second moments. Let V (t)∈RK be a vector-valued
random process. At time t = 0, define Vκ(0) ∼ Q under the product coupling (i.e. independently sampled) and
N(t)=0∈NK
We define Vκ(t) for t > 0 recursively as follows. Z(t) ∼ Q is an i.i.d sample from the distribution. Let
i(t)=argminκ∈{1,...,k}|Vκ(t)−Z(t)|. Then,N(t)=N(t−1)+1i(t) where 1i(t) is the one-hot vector at index i(t) and
Vj(t)=
{ 1
Nj(t)
(Nj(t−1)Vj(t−1)+Z(t)) j= i(t)
Vj(t−1) j 6= i(t)
For sequentialK-means processes, the following holds [96]:
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Lemma C.7. (J. MacQueen, 1967)
Let V ∈Rd be a a sequential k-means process. Then V converges a.s. to an unbiased partition jointly satisfying:
(i)Vj(∞)=argmin
v∈Sj
∫
z∈Sj
(v−z)2dQ(z)
and
(ii) Sj={z :j=argmin
[K]
|Vj(∞)−z|}⊂R
Equivalently, these conditions state that Vj is the centroid of its Voronoi interval [97, 98] with respect to the vector V .
We proceed to give a reduction from the competitive learning market with OLS predictors with a particular choice of
PXY . In turn, this will enable us to concretely characterize the weight estimates asymptotically via MacQueen’s lemma.
LetW =1. Let PX be a point mass at 1. Let i∼Unif(−δ,δ) for 0<δ. In this construction, PY ∼Unif(1−δ,1+δ)
since Y = 1+. In the scalar case, the OLS rule is Wˆ = X
n•Y n
||Xn||2 . For the assumed distribution, the weight estimate is
determined by the empirical mean:
Wˆ =
∑
iyi
n
=1+¯= Yˆ (64)
Let Wˆt(i) denote the i-th predictor’s weight estimate at round t, with Wˆ0(i) being the initial estimate based on the the
seed samples. Let νt(a)=s+
∑t
j=01(SELECT((j)=a) denote the total number of observations made by agent a by
round t (where 1() is the indicator function ). When there is no ambiguity, we will write at=SELECT(t) as shorthand.
At round t, the OLS update is given by:
Wˆt(at)← νt(i)−1
νt(i)
Wˆt−1(at)+
1
νt(i)
yt (65)
Under the assumption of perfect information and rational consumers (α=∞) we have that:
at=argmin
a∈A
|Wˆt(a)−yt| (66)
In prose, at time t, the sample Yt is averaged into the closest of the OLS estimates at time t. This is precisely the
update rule use in [96] to describe the sequentialK-means. However, while the update rule is the same, there remains
one blemish that we must smooth over before we can apply MacQueen’s lemma. Namely, that the intializations between
our case and the sequentialK-means are not the same, since here the seed dataset can consist of more than one example.
It turns out, however, that this issue is easily remedied by noting that the tail of any sequential K-means process is
conditionally independent of Y (t) given only V (t) andN(t). In other words, for τ >0:
V (t+τ) |= (Y (0),..,Y (t))|(V (t),N(t)) (67)
Therefore, when we have s seed points per k agents, we may construct an equivalence relation between the our process
at time 0 and the sequentialK-means process at time (s−1)k via:
∀i :Ni((s−1)k)←νi(0)=s (68)
and
V ((s−1)k)←Wˆ (0) (69)
Thus, we can treat our process Wˆt as a sequentialK-means process conditioned on the sequence head as just stated.
From the definition of the sequentialK-means process, it is clear that conditioning on this measure zero event remains well-
posed. Furthermore, we can conclude that it does not alter the convergence of the tail because for any I⊂RK we have that
Pr(Wˆ (0)∈I)>0 (70)
if and only if
Pr({V ((s−1)k)∈I}∩{Ni((s−1)k)=s,∀i})>0 (71)
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which establishes absolute continuity [99] of the corresponding probability measures over the possible initialization.
From this follows the a.s. convergence of Wˆ [100], and we may dispense with the issue of the initialization and conclude
that Yˆ converge a.s. to an unbiased partition (recalling that Yˆ =Wˆ for our chosen PXY ).
It remains to make use of MacQueen’s lemma to finish our claim. To do so, we point out the well-known result that
there is only one unbiased partition of the uniform distribution over an interval (1−δ,1+δ) [101], namely, the uniform
quantization that sets:
Yˆi(∞)= i2δ
k+1
−δ+1 (72)
or some permutation thereof. Also notice that this result is translation invariant. Translating the interval corresponds
to a translation of the quanta.
It remains to compute the expected MSE over the Yi(∞), noting that a priori, each predictor is uniformly likely to
converge to any of the quanta.
E[(Y −Yˆ (∞))2]=
n∑
i=1
Pr[Yˆ (∞)= i2δ
k+1
−δ+1]E[(Y − i2δ
k+1
+δ−1)2] (73)
=
k∑
i=1
Pr[Yˆ (∞)= i2δ
k+1
−δ]
∫ δ
−δ
1
2δ
(δ− i2δ
k+1
+y)2dy (74)
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
1
2δ
∫ δ
−δ
(δ− i2δ
k+1
+y)2dy (75)
=
1
k
k∑
i=1
1
2δ
(
8δ3(3i2+3i(k+1)+(k+1)2)
3(k+1)2
)
(76)
=
2δ2k
3(k+1)
(77)
To complete the proof, we point out thatW ∗=1 and that the MMSE for predicting Y givenX is given by:
MSE∗(PY |X)=
δ2
3
(78)
And that we may lower bound the supP
Rkt
R1t with our particular choice of PXY .
Thus, taking the limit:
lim
T→∞
sup
P
RkT
R1T
≥ lim
T→∞
E[(Y −Yˆ (T )2]
R1T
=
E[(Y −Yˆ (∞)2]
MSE∗(PY |X)
=
2k
(k+1)
(79)
This completes the proof of part (ii).
Proof of (i) We now turn out attention to the proof of part (i). It will suffice to construct a different distribution that
can be easily analyzed. LetX= 12∆ and define  as follows:
=
{
1
2∆ with prob.
1
2
− 12∆ with prob. 12
Thus, we have that Y = 0 with prob. 1/2 and Y = ∆ with prob. 1/2. The MMSE estimate W ∗ = 1 and the
corresponding MSE is 14∆
2. Let µi = 1# samples for i
∑
jyj denote the empirical mean of the samples observed by agent
i. The OLS estimate will satisfy Yˆi= 12∆Wˆi=µi. Due to the OLS-specified bijection between Yˆ and Wˆ we will work
with Yˆ for convenience without loss of precision.
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Recall we have n predictors. At round t=0, each has been seeded with s i.i.d samples. Let µi be the empirical mean
of the seed samples for the i-th predictor. Recall that OLS estimate Yˆi=µi.
Let i+ =argmax{Yˆi} and i−=argmin{Yˆi}. For now, we will assume that these extreme predictors are unique, and
later address the case in which they are not.
Let aˆt = SELECT(t). In the limit as ∆→∞ we have that only the two extreme predictors, ai+ and ai− will ever
win consumer queries: Pr(aˆt=ai+ |Y =∆)→1 and Pr(aˆt=ai− |Y =0)→1 as ∆→∞. To see this, observe that:
Pr(aˆt=ai+ |Y =∆)
Pr(aˆt=aj |Y =∆) =
exp
(
α(∆−µi+)2
)
exp(α(∆−µj)2) =exp
(
α(µ2i+−µ2j+2∆(µi+−µj))
)
(80)
And so, when j 6= i+ and α>0:
lim
∆→∞
Pr(aˆt=ai+ |Y =∆)
Pr(aˆt=aj |Y =∆) =∞ (81)
because of the fact that µi+≥µj . In the case when the inequality is strict, we can immediately conclude that:
lim
∆→∞
Pr(aˆt=ai+ |Y =∆)=1 (82)
and more precisely, for some ϕ>0
Pr(aˆt=ai+ |Y =∆)=1−Θ(e−ϕ∆) (83)
Due to the fact that number outcomes (i.e. the consumer decision) is finite and a probability vector is normalized.
If the argmax is not unique, then in the first round at which Y =∆, one of the maximizing predictors will be selected
arbitrarily, which will break the equality. Along those lines, note that Wˆi+ is monotone increasing after observing more
samples of Y =∆. A similar argument holds in the case when Y =0.
Combining these two cases, we conclude that only the 2 extreme predictors will ever receive additional samples,
whereas the other n−2 predictors will maintain the weight estimates based solely on their seed samples.
Later on, it will be useful to let ∆ scale with the number of rounds T . This does not pose a difficulty when the scaling
is chosen judiciously. With ∆ =
√
T , it is easy to verify that the aforementioned limits hold over all rounds. Let E(τ)
be the event that aˆt=ai+ for all 1≤ t<τ with Yt=∆. Then:
Pr(E(T ))≥
∏
1≤t<T
Pr(aˆt=ai+ |Yt=∆,E(t−1))≥
∏
1≤t<T
Pr(aˆ0 =ai+ |Y0 =∆) (84)
because of the conditional independence of consumer decisions and monotone increasing trajectory of Wˆi+ in time.
However, recalling the convergence rate in ∆ previously established:
Pr(E)=Θ(1−e−ϕ
√
T )T (85)
And thus, with the superpolynomial convergence we still obtain:
lim
T→∞
Pr(E)=1 (86)
We will return to this analysis later to complete the proof. For now, we can proceed to lower bound the gap by taking
a weighted average of the MSE in between the extremal and non-extremal predictors. For the two extreme predictors,
we will have that Yˆ →∆ and Yˆ →0. In this case the MSE is 12∆2 for both.
For the remaining non-extremal predictors, we can bound the expected MSE as follows. Since they do not obtain further
samples beyond the seed set, we can directly analyze the expected MSE of the OLS estimate under s seed samples. However,
we must still account for the fact that we are conditioning on the event that these are non-extremal estimates. This is rather
cumbersone and is difficult to do exactly, but we can use the following 3 steps of approximations to obtain a lower bound.
(i) The conditional variance of a non-extremal estimate is most reduced when n=3.
Yˆi+ =max{Yˆj}nj=1 (87)
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Yˆi−=min{Yˆj}nj=1 (88)
Thus, we have that Yˆj ∈ [Yˆi− ,Yˆi+ ] for all j. Recall we are seeking a lower bound on
Var(Yˆj |j 6= i+,j 6= i−)=Var(Yˆj |Yˆj ∈ [Yˆi− ,Yˆi+ ]) (89)
From this, we immediately obtain that for n′′≥n′:
Var(Yˆj |j 6= i+,j 6= i−,n=n′)≤Var(Yˆj |j 6= i+,j 6= i−,n=n′′) (90)
because the cdf of Yˆi+ (Yˆi−) is monotone increasing (decreasing) in n, given that it is the maximum (minimum) of
n i.i.d random variables. Therefore, lowering bounding the case when n=3 is sufficient to lower bound all cases.
(ii) We may lower bound the probability of a lower tail deviations of Yˆi− by (ignoring that it is the minimum – treating
it as an generic i.i.d sample) and by using the standard bound [90]:
Pr(Bi(s, 12 )<k)≥ 115exp
(−16
k (k/2−k)2
)
(Recalling that Yˆ ∼ ∆2sBi(s, 12 ) ).
Setting a deviation of
√
s
4 results in a lower bound of
1
15e on the lower tail. We can use symmetry to apply the argument
to Yˆi+ as a lower bound to the upper tail. Thus, we have that
Pr(
∆
2
+
∆
√
s
4
≤ Yˆi−≤∆2 −
∆
√
s
4
)≥ 1
1764
(91)
(iii) Once an interval has been established, we can treat the non-extremal estimate Wˆj as a truncated Binomial. By
Lemma C.4, we can lower bound the variance of the truncated Binomial with a Binomial over the truncated support.
IfZ∼Bi(s, 12 ) then
Var
(
Z|{
√
s
4
≤Z− s
2
≤
√
s
4
}
)
≥
√
s
8
(92)
and
Var
(
∆
2s
Z|{
√
s
4
≤Z− s
2
≤
√
s
4
}
)
≥ ∆
16s3/2
(93)
Recalling that Yˆj ∼ ∆2sBi(s, 12 ), we have the variance conditioned on eventH= {j 6= i+,j 6= i−} is lower bounded
as follows:
Var(Yj |H)=Var(Yj |H,F)Pr(F)+Var(Yj |H,F¯)(1−Pr(F))≥Var(Yj |H,F)Pr(F) (94)
And since we know have a bound for Pr(F) and Var(Yj |H,F) we conclude:
Var(Yj |H)≥Var(Yj |H,F)Pr(F)≥ ∆
2
(7056×4)s3/2 (95)
WhereF={Yˆi−≤ ∆2 −∆
√
s
4 ,Yˆi−≥ ∆2 + ∆
√
s
4 }
Note that Yˆj is unbiased. From this, it follows that the excess MSE risk is given by its variance. Define
δ= Yˆj−EYˆj= Yˆj−∆2 .
MSE(Yˆj)=E[
1
2
(
∆
2
−δ)2+ 1
2
(
∆
2
+δ)2]=
∆2
4
+Eδ2 =MSE∗+Var(Yˆj)
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Note that we have established that for the extremal predictors, the asymptotic MSE is ∆
2
2 , and for the non-
extremal predictors, the asymptotic MSE is at least ∆
2
4 +
∆2
(7056×4)s3/2 . Combining these in-expectation gives:
k−2
k (
∆2
4 +
∆2
(7056×4)s3/2 )+
2
k
∆2
2
Thus, to conclude the proof, let us scale ∆=
√
T :
lim
T→∞
sup
P
RW
R∗
≥ lim
T→∞
k−2
k (
∆2
4 +
∆2
(7056×4)s3/2 )+
2
k
∆2
2
∆2
4
≥1+ 1
7056s3/2
+
2
k
.
which yields the inequality in part (ii).
C.2.4 Proof of Theorem 4.4.
As a clarification, when we refer to pairwise covariance ρ, we refer to:
ρ=Cov(W1,W2)=E(W1W2)−E(W1)E(W1) (96)
where W1 = 1(Yˆ 1 = Y ) and W2 = 1(Yˆ 2 = Y ) for Yˆ 1 and Yˆ 2 denote the predictions from agent 1 and agent 2
respectively. Notice that E(W1W2) equals the probability that both predictions are correct. Notice that the marginal
probability of a correct prediction is given byR2t when there are two predictors. Thus, the basic definition of covariance
already constrains ρ as follows:
−R2+(R2)2<ρ<R2−(R2)2 (97)
Recall this is related to the Pearson correlation, which we denote by ρ¯, via normalization:
ρ¯=ρ/(R2−(R2)2) (98)
Theorem C.8. Assume a learning competition at round t. Let ρ be the pairwise covariance between two predictors.
Assume the following holds:
Assume a learning competition at round t. Define δ = R1t −R2t . Let ρ be the pairwise covariance between two
predictors. Assume the following holds:
1. 0<δ< 15
2. 1−5δ19/10>R1> 23
3. Rk0< 23
4. ρ<R2−(R2)2−2δ
Then there exists 0<c1<c2<∞ such that if c1<α<c2 then the expected prediction quality for users at round t is maxi-
mized by some k∗ number of predictors such that 1<k∗<∞. In particular, c1 =log R
2−(R2)2
R2−(R2)2+2δ and c2 =log
R2+δ
2(1−R2−δ) .
Proof. By assumption, we have that predictors at round 0 are weak predictors, meaning they are independently accurate
with probabilityRk0 = 12 +ε. Note we thus have ε<1/6 by the assumption. As we will see shortly, in the limit of infinite
predictors, the algorithm’s performance after obtaining additional samples is immaterial.
A(τ) be the expected model accuracy when trained with i.i.d τ samples. We define At(k) as the expected model
accuracy at round t of G, taken over to the consumer decision distribution. In other words,At(k) is the expected prediction
quality for users when the competition has k learners. Let Yˆ (i)t be the i-th learner’s prediction at time t (or equivalently
let Yˆ (a)t be learner a’s prediction). When it is unambiguous to do so, we will define at=SELECT(t). Because most
of the variables in this proof are implicit at time t, when the time is not explicitly stated or sub-scripted, assume that
the variable refers to time t.
At(k)=
∑
a∈A
Pr[a=at]Pr[Yˆ
(a)
t =Yt|a=at] (99)
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where we recall from the definition of SELECT used in G that:
Pr[a=at]=
exp(α1{Yˆ (a)t =Yt})
Zt+exp(α1{Yˆ (a)t =Yt})
(100)
whereZt=
∑
a∈Aexp(α1{Yˆ (a)t =Y })
We proceed to give an expression for Pr[a= at] in the limit as k→∞. Let Bt⊂A be the subset of predictors that
have been queried at least once by time t. It follows that |Bt||A| ≤ tk which implies |Bt||A| →0 as n→∞. From this, it follows
that the Pr[a∈Bt]≤ teαk which also vanishes as k gets large. With this, we can revise Eq. 99 as follows:
At(n)=
∑
a∈Bt
Pr[a=at|a∈Bt]Pr(Yˆ a=Y |a∈Bt)+
∑
a/∈Bt
Pr[a=at|a /∈Bt]Pr(Yˆ a=Y |a /∈Bt) (101)
We give the following lower and upper bounds forA, which can be easily derived using the law of total probability
[94] and the fact that 0≤A≤1:
Pr(at /∈Bt)At(k)|{at /∈Bt}≤At(k)≤Pr(at /∈Bt)At(k)|{at /∈Bt}+Pr[at∈Bt] (102)
Taking the limit in k vanishes Pr[a∈Bt], yielding:
At(∞)=At(∞)|{at /∈Bt} (103)
We proceed to compute this quantity At(∞)|{at /∈Bt}. To do so, we make use of the weak predictor assumption.
From that, may treat the aggregate predictions of predictors not in Bt as following a Binomial distribution with success
probability of 12 +ε. Define κt= |A/Bt| ∈ [k−t,k−1] = Θ(k). Let Vt be the number of weak predictors with correct
predictions at time t. Then V ∼Bin(κt, 12 +ε). Let µ denote the mean of V , EV =µ. Then, the conditional probability
that consumer ut selects a correct weak predictor is:
Pr(Yˆ at =Y |at /∈Bt,V =ν)= νe
α
ν(eα−1)+κ (104)
Let us rewrite V in terms of its deviation from its mean: V =µ+∆ for implicitly defined random deviation ∆. By
the central limit theorem [94, 99, 102, 103], we know that deviations of the Binomial with κ trials [94, 99, 102] are order
Θ(
√
k) implying Pr(|∆|≥Ck0.6)→0 as k→∞ for any finite C. Thus, let us introduce the deviation into the above
equation and normalize by κ:
Pr(Yˆ at =Y |at /∈Bt,∆=∆)=
(µκ+
∆
κ )e
α
(µκ+
∆
κ )(e
α−1)+1 =
( 12 +ε+
∆
κ )e
α
( 12 +ε+
∆
κ )(e
α−1)+1 (105)
By the aforementioned line of reasoning, because the the risk is bounded, we may ignore any large deviations for
∆ with respect the mean when taking a limit in k. Computing the limit is direct and yields:
lim
k→∞
( 12 +ε+
∆
κ )e
α
( 12 +ε+
∆
κ )(e
α−1)+1 =
( 12 +ε)e
α
( 12 +ε)(e
α−1)+1 =
eα
eα+1−χ (106)
For χ= 4ε2ε+1 . Notice that ε<
1
6 implies χ<
1
2 . From this we establish: At(∞) = e
α
eα+1−ε . By definition, we know
At(1) =R1t . Given that the joint distribution for 2 predictors is determined by the marginals and the covariance, we
can solve forAt(2). We find:
At(2)=ρ+(R2)2+ 2e
α(R2−ρ−(R2)2)
eα+1
(107)
where we recallR2t =R1t −δ. Note that if both At(2)>At(1) and At(2)>At(∞) hold, then the theorem stands.
Recall thatR2− (R2)2 ≥ ρ≥ 0 based on the definition of covariance. Let us examine the constraints placed on key
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quantitiesR1, ρ, δ, ε, and α based on the two inequalities. Of course, there are an intrinsic set of constraints on these
five quantities by assumption or definition:
1>R1> 2
3
(108)
1
5
>δ>0 (109)
α≥0 (110)
R2−(R2)2≥ρ≥−R2 (111)
1
2
>χ>0 (112)
The question remains what intervals remain that satisfy bothAt(2)>At(1) andAt(2)>At(∞). We begin with former:
ρ+(R1−δ)2+ 2e
α(R1−δ−ρ−(R1−δ)2)
eα+1
>R1 (113)
It is not difficult to check (perhaps by using a computer algebra system such as Mathematica2) that this inequality
is satisfied if the additional constraints hold:
−R2<ρ<ψ−2δ (114)
R1< 1+2δ+
√
1−4δ
2
=1−ω(δ2) (115)
α> log
ψ−ρ
ψ−ρ−2δ (116)
ψ=R1−(R1)2+2δR1−δ2 (117)
Loosely, these conditions say that ρ cannot be too large. This is natural since the users gain no benefit from two learners
when they are perfectly correlated. And, interestingly, they say thatR1 cannot be too large either (notice that here we
use the usual notion of asymptotic little-omega with respect to the limit as δ→ 0). This is also fairly natural because
ifR1 is too close to perfect, then there is little space for improvement based on two models that achieve an individual
accuracy ofR2 =R1−δ. In particular, for a little bit of slackness, we can simplify the upper bound onR1 since
1−5δ19/10< 1+2δ+
√
1−4δ
2
(118)
for all 0<δ< 15 . This can also be easily verified.
3 Of course, both of these restrictions vanish at least linearly in δ.
We can now proceed to resolve the additional constraints implied by the second key inequality,At(2)>At(∞):
ρ+(R2)2+ 2e
α(R2−ρ−(R2)2)
eα+1
>
eα
eα+1−χ (119)
2For example, using the following one line Mathematica command: Reduce[{1 > rho > -1, expalpha > 1, 1 >
R1 > 2/3, 1/5 > delta > 0, (-delta + R1)^2 + (2 expalpha (-delta + R1 - (-delta + R1)^2 - rho))/(1 +
expalpha) + rho > R1}, {expalpha}]
3For example, using the following one line Mathematica command: Reduce[1/2 + delta + Sqrt[1 - 4 delta]/2 > 1
- 5 delta^(19/10), delta]
30
COMPETING AI - SEPTEMBER 16, 2020
As before, with the aid of computer algebra4, we can translate the above inequality into constraints on the quantities
of interest. The following additional constraints are sufficient to implyAt(2)>At(∞):
α< log
R2
2(1−R2) (120)
Thus, in contrast to before, we can see that we now have an upper bound on α as well. Finally, we can verify5 that
ψ
ψ+2δ <
R2+δ
2(1−R2−δ) holds ifR2<1−δ which trivially holds by definition. This implies that given the assumptions onR1,
ε, δ, and ρ there always exists an interval for α that will allow the two key inequalities,At(2)>At(∞) andAt(2)>At(1)
to simultaneously hold. To reiterate, if the following assumptions hold:
−R2<ρ<R2−(R2)2−2δ (121)
0<ε<
1
6
(122)
0<δ<
1
5
(123)
2
3
<R1<1−5δ19/10 (124)
then there exists an interval for α given by:
log
R2−(R2)2
R2−(R2)2+2δ <α< log
R2+δ
2(1−R2−δ) (125)
such that we can guarantee:
1<k∗<∞ (126)
4 For example, using the following one line Mathematica command: Reduce[{R2 - R2^2 > rho > -R2, expalpha
> 1, 1 > R2 > 2/3, rho + (2 expalpha (R2 - R2^2 - rho))/(1 + expalpha) + R2^2 > expalpha/(1/2 +
expalpha)},{rho}]
5 For example, using the following one line Mathematica command: Reduce[{(R2 - R2^2)/(2 delta + R2 - R2^2) <
(delta + R2)/(2 (1 - delta - R2)), 1 > R2 > 2/3, 1/5 > delta > 0}, {R2}]
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